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Balancing the Fourth Amendment Scales:
The Bad-Faith "Exception" to
Exclusionary Rule Limitations
by
GEORGE C. THOMAS III* & BARRY S. POLLACK**
Introduction
Based in part on models we developed in two recent articles,1 we
propose here the creation of a new category of Fourth Amendment2
violations. Current doctrine divides Fourth Amendment violations
into two categories for the purpose of deciding whether to apply the
exclusionary rule as a remedy. One category contains "good-faith"
violations of the Fourth Amendment, which require no remedy.3 All
other violations fall into the second category; because good faith is
missing in this category, the exclusionary rule looms as a potential
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University at Newark.
** Associate, Chadbourne & Parke. We thank Randall Amster, Alison Brenner, Joe
Grano, Francine Menaker, Eric Neisser, Wendy Pollack, Lloyd Weinreb, and Marsha
Wenk for very helpful reactions to earlier versions of this Article. We especially thank
Wayne LaFave for his extremely detailed set of suggestions in response to an early draft
and Stanley S. Arkin for his significant contributions to the formulation of the bad-faith
"exception."
1. See George C. Thomas I& Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights From A Remedy: A
Societal View Of The Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. Ruv. 147 (1993) [hereinafter Thomas
& Pollack, Saving Rights]; George C. Thomas H & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt,
Juries, and Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. Rnv. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Thomas & Pollack, Rethinking
Guilt].
2. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule
when evidence found in good-faith reliance on a defective statute); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984) (same; good-faith reliance on a defective warrant).
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remedy that will deny the government certain uses of evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This typology is too crude; the general category of "all other vio-
lations" contains a wide range of government conduct and culpability.
As presently constituted, the general category would include a police
officer's mistake about whether he had probable cause to move a
stereo a few inches to examine its serial number 4 as well as a warrant-
less search of a house by police officers who lacked probable cause
and who, in the bargain, ignored both the owner's demands to cease
and requests by the owner's counsel to be admitted to the premises.5
The officers' culpability and the scope of the violation are obviously
far greater in the second case than in the first. Yet these cases are
treated the same for purposes of applying the exclusionary rule, which
is to say that in both cases the evidence found is excluded for some
purposes, but not for others.
When the exclusionary rule applies, it denies the government the
use of evidence by excluding it from consideration at trial. But, as
discussed at greater length later in the paper,6 the exclusionary rule is
limited in four ways: as to (1) the class of persons that can benefit
from exclusion (traditionally called "standing"), (2) the type of pro-
ceedings that may serve as an occasion for suppression, (3) the class of
evidence sufficiently related to the violation to deserve suppression,
and (4) the type of use to be made of the evidence at trial. Thus, no
matter how flagrant the violation, evidence found as a result may be
admissible under these limitations on the exclusionary rule.
To put these limitations in a practical perspective, consider a case
in which the police stop a car, search it in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and find gambling devices in the trunk. The amalgam of
limitations on the exclusionary rule would fit together as follows. The
gambling devices, though seized in violation of the car owner's Fourth
Amendment rights, may be introduced in a criminal case against de-
fendants who were mere passengers in the car when the search took
place.7 The same evidence may be used in a civil proceeding to confis-
4. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
5. The facts are roughly those in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). It is not clear
from the Mapp opinion that the officers lacked probable cause, but they did not find what
they sought. Id. at 668-69. We will discuss the implications of the facts in Mapp more fully
infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part III.
7. The use of "mere passengers" is meant to indicate passengers who have no privacy
interest in the car beyond their status as passengers. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148
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cate the devices. 8 It may be used to obtain an indictment against the
owner of the car whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated.9 It
may also be used to impeach the owner's testimony if she takes the
stand at her criminal trial.' 0 Finally, the owner's confession, made
several days later, would likely be admissible even though she would
not have confessed in the absence of the seized evidence. 1
These limitations on the exclusionary rule may make sense when
a non-flagrant Fourth Amendment violation produces the evidence,
but they should be re-examined when the state actor finds evidence by
means of bad-faith conduct.' 2 In effect, the Court had its "thumb on
the scales" when it created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule while ignoring the consequences of bad-faith violations. To
rebalance the scales, a bad-faith category of Fourth Amendment vio-
lations should be established at the other end of the spectrum from
the good-faith violations. The Fourth Amendment, according to this
view, would consist of three types of violations: good-faith violations
that require no remedy, intermediate violations remedied by the cur-
rent version of the exclusionary rule, and bad-faith violations that re-
quire a broader, less constrained exclusionary rule.
This Article contains four parts. Part I sketches a general justifi-
cation for our assertion that a bad-faith violation requires a broader
exclusionary rule. Part II explores how to determine when police are
(1978). Presumably, the car owner's spouse or children would have a privacy interest suffi-
cient to confer standing on them. See id. at 167 (White, J., dissenting).
8. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 701 (1965) (dicta).
9. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (pre-indictment grand jury).
The evidence can be used in other non-criminal contexts as well. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (deportation hearing); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976) (civil tax prosecution).
10. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (approving use of illegally-seized
evidence to impeach the defendant). Illegally-seized evidence may not, however, be used
to impeach witnesses other than the defendant. See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
11. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
12. The term "bad-faith search" has been used to identify situations in which the mo-
tives 6f the police officer create a Fourth Amendment violation when none would other-
wise have been found. See John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 70, 89-
92 (1982) (arguing for a "bad-faith" doctrine that turns an otherwise permissible search
incident to arrest into a violation if the officer used the arrest as a pretext to make the
search). But cf Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-37 (1978) (rejecting this concept);
I WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 80-97 (2d ed., 1987) (generally approving of
Scott). We use the term "bad faith" quite differently. Although we believe that motive is a
relevant factor in suppression determinations, we do not address the question of whether
an improper motive can turn an otherwise legal search into an illegal one. Rather, we
begin with a Fourth Amendment violation and ask whether it is sufficiently flagrant that
courts should consider applying an expanded exclusionary rule.
November 1993]
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acting in bad faith. Part III analyzes each of the four current limita-
tions on the exclusionary rule and examines whether that limitation
should apply to evidence discovered by bad-faith conduct. Part IV
discusses the procedure by which courts can make the bad-faith
determination.
]l. Correlation Between Violation and Remedy
In an early draft of this Article, we treated as almost self-evident
the general principle that the scope of available remedies should vary
directly with the wrongfulness of Fourth Amendment violations. In
other words, the more wrongful the violation, the greater the remedy
should be. This intuition was based partly on assumptions about de-
terrence; the more wrongful the violation, the more society would
want to deter it and, therefore, the greater the cost of the violation
should be. A second aspect of our intuition was that the very integrity
of the justice system is undermined when evidence seized by egre-
giously wrongful conduct can be used to obtain judgments. Our intui-
tion was also based-quite controversially, it turned out-on the
notion that an expanded exclusionary rule simply treats the govern-
ment as wrongdoer in the same way that the government treats citi-
zens who violate the law. On this view, the more wrongful the
constitutional violation, the greater the penalty should be, with the
exclusionary rule being viewed as the most efficacious method of pe-
nalizing the government. Because this proportionality principle was
challenged by several readers, and because it is the broadest justifica-
tion for our thesis, we begin with it.
A. The Kantian Proportionality Principle
Though we will return to the question of what constitutes a bad-
faith Fourth Amendment violation, we begin by describing a paradigm
case: an officer conducts a detailed search of an entire house, based
on nothing more than a hunch, and seizes business records. Here the
officer acted knowingly, made a severe intrusion into the home-
owner's privacy, and damaged the homeowner by seizing business
records.
Should the government's penalty correspond in some fashion to
the wrongfulness of its Fourth Amendment violation? The wrongful-
ness of criminal violations by citizens affects the degree of punishment
[Vol. 45
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meted out to them.13 Similarly, it is beyond peradventure that the
degree of harm caused by tortfeasors affects their civil liability. In-
deed, the notion that a greater harm or wrong requires a greater pen-
alty underlies both Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism and Immanuel
Kant's retributive theory of justice.14 The utilitarian justification of
greater penalties is based on notions of deterrence, and will be dis-
cussed shortly. Kant's justification is broader. He posited that retri-
bution was the mechanism by which society repaired the damage to
the fabric of justice caused by the wrong. Thus, greater penalties for
greater harms are not merely defensible or useful; they are neces-
sary.' 5 Kant's classic and chilling example assumed that inhabitants of
an island had "decided to separate and disperse themselves around
the world." Kant argued that they must first execute the "last mur-
derer remaining in prison ... ,so that everyone will duly receive what
his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be
fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the
punishment."' 6
The Kantian principle that a greater wrong deserves a greater
penalty is ingrained in our culture. Thus, unless one's account of jus-
tice distinguishes between individuals and the government, the degree
of wrongfulness of government conduct must be relevant to the ap-
propriate response. Plato refused to draw any distinction between the
government and the individual when evaluating the actor's morality or
justice, contending that the meaning of justice can best be understood
by looking at what it means for the government to act justly, for that is
"writ large against the sky" for all to see.' 7 While this parallel has
sometimes been rejected,' 8 it has proven more lasting than the oppos-
13. See, e.g., 2 GERALD T. McFADDEN ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING MANUAL
§ 2F1.1 (1992) (table showing offense level increase based upon amount of loss inflicted);
see also Barry S. Pollack, Note, Deserts and Death. Limits on Maximum Punishment, 44
RUTrERs L. REv. 985, 992-96 (1992) (discussing relationship between harm and penalty).
14. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRtIcIPrLES OF MORLS AND
LEGISLATION 181 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1823); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JusTICmE 99-102 (John Ladd trans., 1965); see also Pollack, supra note 13, at
994 (citing, among others, Jeremy Bentham, and concluding that a correlation between
harm and penalty reflects "societal perceptions of opprobrium" and "provides a more co-
herent and fair system").
15. KANT, supra note 14, at 99-102.
16. Id. at 102.
17. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 368-69 (B. Jowett ed., 1941).
18. See, eg., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 148-50 (Francis B. Randall ed., 1964)
(1651) (positing a sovereign against which no claim of injustice could be made).
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HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ing view. For example, Plato's parallel informs a famous passage from
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States 9 :
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizens. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy.
20
We will omit an extended proof that citizens in a free society ex-
pect their government to suffer a penalty if it does not abide by the
same standards of morality that citizens apply in their own lives. We
think we were right that this point is almost self-evident. The readers
of the early draft did not have difficulty with the appropriateness of
some sort of Kantian proportionality principle in the Fourth Amend-
ment context. Rather, they thought the difficulty lay in deciding how
the government should be punished for its wrongful conduct. Will-
fully violating the Fourth Amendment is, after all, both a federal
crime and a federal tort,2 ' and the offending government agents can
thus be punished directly and proportionally. These avenues of pun-
ishment are, however, both conceptually and practically inadequate.
At a practical level, federal prosecutors bring very few criminal
prosecutions against offending government actors, at least in part be-
cause the prosecutors are typically protective of the federal officers on
whom they depend and are rarely informed of violations by state of-
ficers. Moreover, few civil suits are brought. Of those that are
brought, few are successful even when flagrant violations are al-
leged.2 2 The imposition of penalties in only a few cases, more or less
at random, is inconsistent with a Kantian, desert-based conception of
19. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
20. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (authorizing criminal penalties); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988) (authorizing civil damages).
22. James Spiotto surveyed the suits filed against the Chicago police from 1961 to
1972 and found that only four involved allegations of illegal search and seizure activity.
See James E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 269-71 (1973). Two of the suits contained alle-
gations of flagrant violations (searches of homes without probable cause or warrants). One
of these suits ended in a settlement for nominal damages (less than $3,000) while the other
ended in a verdict for the defendant. Id. at 271-72. Spiotto concluded, "It appears not only
that citizens are reluctant to sue police for tort or civil rights violations in regard to illegal
search and seizure, but also that juries may be reluctant to award damages in such actions."
Id. at 272.
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justice. A system that provides some type of punishment in every case
in which a judge finds wrongful government conduct would be more
just.
Of course, one must decide whether the exclusionary rule is an
appropriate "penalty" for the government.23 One could view the ex-
clusionary rule as a remedial, rather than punitive, device. Or, assum-
ing the essentially punitive nature of the exclusionary rule, one could
argue that it punishes society rather than the government; after all,
society is harmed if a guilty person goes free and commits a crime she
would otherwise not have committed.2 4
We view these objections as excessively technical and legalistic.
Viewed pragmatically, the suppression of wrongfully acquired evi-
dence makes the task of proceeding with the trial more difficult and
thus penalizes the executive branch of government, the very branch
that acquired the evidence by wrongful means. Moreover, application
of the exclusionary rule is a highly visible event, closely associated
with a criminal trial. Thus, its application highlights the wrongful gov-
ernment conduct at the very moment its consequences are most evi-
dent. Ignoring the misconduct at this stage of the process at least
implicitly minimizes its seriousness. Of course, one consequence of
suppression is potential future harm to society, but that hardly means
that the government itself is not also being punished.
Consider the analogy of the entrapment doctrine. The entrap-
ment doctrine "punishes" the government by denying it the ability to
proceed with a criminal prosecution when the crime would not have
happened but for governmental bad-faith conduct. It is true that the
Court has based entrapment on a presumed Congressional intent not
to punish defendants who are deemed to lack the requisite mens rea.25
But most commentators, and more than a few judges, view that ration-
ale as no more than a fiction.
26
23. For an example of the Supreme Court referring to the exclusionary rule as a "pen-
alty" against the government, see New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990).
24. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415-17 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
26. See, e.g., id. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, JJ.,
concurring); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 282 (2d ed.
1992) (ascribing the "fiction" charge to the opponents of the mens rea rationale); Louis M.
Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 Sup.
CT. REv. 111, 115 n.13 (noting that "commentators have overwhelmingly favored an objec-
tive approach" that rejects the fictional mens rea rationale).
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We agree. In our view, the real rationale for exonerating en-
trapped defendants is that the wrongful government conduct, and not
the defendant, is seen as the cause of the crime. On this view, the
entrapment doctrine manifests an important parallel between citizens
and the government: each is subject to punishment for committing (or
causing) crimes.2 7 The entrapment doctrine thus punishes the govern-
ment by preventing it from prosecuting the crime it has caused. Like-
wise, a bad-faith Fourth Amendment doctrine would punish the
government by preventing it from using evidence it would not have
had but for its bad-faith conduct.
Working from this premise, the wrongfulness of a constitutional
violation should be considered in deciding whether to suppress evi-
dence. This is neither a surprising nor a new idea. For example, when
the Supreme Court decided Rochin v. California,28 the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule did not yet apply to the states.29 None-
theless, the Court ordered the evidence suppressed under the author-
ity of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
ground that the police officers' conduct, which included forced stom-
ach-pumping, was conduct that "shocks the conscience." 30 The Court
noted a concern with the "community's sense of fair play and de-
cency," explaining that "[n]othing would be more calculated to dis-
credit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society" than "to
sanction the brutal conduct" that produced the evidence in question. 31
Similarly, in Brown v. Mississippi,32 the Court held that using
confessions obtained by methods "revolting to the sense of justice...
as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due pro-
cess."'33 The Rochin and Brown decisions demonstrate that suppres-
sion is required, on a case-by-case basis under the Due Process
Clause, when the government's conduct is sufficiently egregious. The
extent to which this doctrine reaches today is unclear, however. The
application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states34
27. Since the doctrine's inception in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), a
vigorous debate has occurred over how to decide when the government is responsible for
causing a crime. But this debate does not detract from our point that the core idea of
entrapment manifests a parallel between individual and government morality.
28. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
29. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (post-Rochin case mandating exclusionary
rule for state courts).
30. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
31. Id. at 173-74.
32. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
33. Id. at 286.
34. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
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and the broad protection against coerced confessions created by Mi-
randa v. Arizona35 seem to leave little room for the Due Process
Clause to operate as the basis for exclusion. Indeed, defendants'
Rochin-type claims are most often raised in vain 6 While the Fourth
Amendment should offer more protection against flagrant govern-
ment misconduct involving searches or seizures than the "shock-the-
conscience" test of the Due Process Clause,37 Rochin and Brown sup-
port our basic point: The wrongfulness of a constitutional violation is
relevant to whether or how the government should be permitted to
use evidence found by means of the violation.
If one accepts that government conduct should be evaluated by
the same standards of justice as that of individuals, what we have
called the Kantian proportionality principle must apply to the Fourth
Amendment. The remaining issue then is whether the exclusionary
rule is the appropriate means of punishing the government more se-
verely when its behavior is more culpable. In the absence of a more
efficacious legislative remedy for flagrant police misconduct, the ex-
clusionary rule remains, in our view, the best mechanism for assessing
a proportional penalty.
B. Governmental Integrity
Pure notions of Kantian retribution may be somewhat out of
place in the exclusionary rule debate because exclusion is an issue
only when the police have found evidence of guilt. Even the most
flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment is not without some so-
cial justification if it produces evidence of a crime. But viewing har-
sher sanctions for flagrant government violations as an expression of
community outrage is an independent ground for denying the govern-
ment the fruits of its bad-faith conduct. As we have argued else-
where,38 a deeply held societal convention underlies and informs the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures. The community is outraged when this convention is violated,
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For an argument that Miranda's protection may be at least
partly illusory, see George C. Thomas HI, A Philosophical Account of CoercedSelf-Incrim-
ination, 5 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 79 (1993).
36. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (holding Rochin not appli-
cable because the defendant was not physically coerced); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UN-
DERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 237 (1991) (noting that Rochin "is only infrequently
applied today to exclude real evidence secured from a person in a violent manner").
37. The Court has restricted the Rochin doctrine to "coercion, violence or brutality."
See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954).
38. See Thomas & Pollack, Saving Rights, supra note 1, at 158-63.
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particularly when the violation is willful, broad in scope, and substan-
tially unjustifiable.
The outrage results from a perceived failure of governmental in-
tegrity. The interest in governmental integrity is manifested in Plato's
argument that the meaning of justice for individuals can be gleaned
from what justice means as applied to the government, for the latter is
nothing more than individual justice "writ large" for all to see. Recent
highly publicized incidents, such as the Rodney King beating, show
how bad-faith governmental conduct undermines the public percep-
tion of the integrity of those who are charged with the responsibility
of enforcing the rules.39 Public skepticism about governmental integ-
rity can only increase if evidence derived from bad-faith police con-
duct is admitted by application of some arcane exception to the
exclusionary rule. Moreover, bad-faith violations seem likely to un-
dermine the public perception of governmental integrity to a degree
that is disproportionate to the frequency of their occurrence. One
forced stomach-pumping can create more skepticism about police in-
tegrity than dozens of technically incorrect warrants. Thus, preserving
governmental integrity requires a broader exclusionary rule when the
evidence is uncovered by bad-faith violations of the Fourth
Amendment.
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court justified the exclusionary rule on
two grounds: deterrence and judicial integrity.40 The notion of "judi-
cial integrity" is, we believe, part of governmental integrity. In United
States v. Janis,4 1 however, the Court merged the judicial integrity ra-
tionale into the deterrence rationale, explaining that the imperative of
judicial integrity is to ensure adequate deterrence and no more.42 But
Janis did not involve a bad-faith violation; the Fourth Amendment
claim challenged a search based on a technically defective warrant,43
which today would qualify as a good-faith search.
A distinction can be drawn between the morality of intermediate
violations and that of bad-faith violations. A police officer who vio-
lates the Constitution, but does not act in bad faith, is arguably not
engaging in unjust or immoral conduct. Zealous policing, up to some
point, is a social good. In these cases of nonflagrant violations, the
39. See Thomas & Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy, supra note 1, at 5-6
(discussing societal reaction to the Rodney King incident).
40. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 222-23 (1960).
41. 428 U.S. 433, 457 n.35 (1976).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 435 n.1.
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Court's merger of judicial integrity and deterrence is defensible. But
when a police officer engages in bad-faith conduct, she is acting im-
morally. In these cases, governmental injustice will be "writ large" for
all to see. In this limited context, at least, Justice Brandeis was right to
worry about what the government is "teach[ing] the whole people by
its example." 44 In this limited context, at least, judges who ignore the
government's flagrant immoral conduct and admit the fruits of the
government's bad faith are themselves part of the governmental
injustice.
Our entrapment analogy is apt here. In entrapment cases, as in
cases involving bad-faith Fourth Amendment conduct, the govern-
ment seeks to benefit from wrongdoing that has crossed the line be-
tween zealous policing and egregious misconduct. In the Court's first
entrapment case, Justice Roberts stressed "the inherent right of the
court not to be made the instrument of wrong."45 A revived notion of
judicial integrity in bad-faith Fourth Amendment cases would simi-
larly require judges to avoid endorsing the harm that has resulted
from the government's bad-faith conduct.
Although the Janis Court merged the concept of judicial integrity
into deterrence for intermediate Fourth Amendment violations, the
Court accepted our argument that an independent role for judicial in-
tegrity would require a much broader exclusionary rule. In a case de-
cided the same day as Janis, the Court noted that notions of judicial
integrity, if "[1]ogically extended," would require a broader exclusion-
ary rule that would include the full availability of habeas proceedings,
as well as abandonment of the standing requirement, impeachment
exception, and grand jury exception.46 The Court rejected this con-
ceptualization of a broad exclusionary rule, but the underlying viola-
tions at issue were not flagrant,47 thus technically leaving unresolved
the effect of judicial integrity concerns in bad-faith cases.
When evidence has been obtained by bad-faith police conduct, an
additional integrity-related justification for a broader exclusionary
44. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,456 (1932) (separate opinion of Roberts, J.,
joined by Brandeis and Stone, JJ.).
46. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). We discuss each of these limitations on
the exclusionary rule in Part III, infra.
47. In Stone, 428 U.S. at 495, the state courts had found no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion. While the state courts might have been wrong, it is unlikely they found no violation
in the face of evidence of a bad-faith violation. Similarly, in Janis, 428 U.S. at 435 n.1, the
facts disclose a violation that would today call for application of the Leon good-faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. See Unites States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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rule arises: In these cases, the probative value of the seized physical
evidence is subject to question. 48 If police officers are willing to en-
gage in flagrant misconduct to obtain evidence against a particular
suspect, they may also misrepresent their findings in some way, such
as where they found evidence or the suspect's physical proximity to it.
In extreme cases, police might even "plant" evidence. While these
types of misrepresentation may be rare, the trustworthiness of the of-
ficers and, concomitantly, the trustworthiness of the evidence is re-
duced when bad-faith misconduct has occurred.
An analogy to the self-incrimination doctrine is helpful.
Although fruits of a Miranda violation can be admitted to impeach a
defendant, involuntary confessions are inadmissible for impeach-
ment. 49 One rationale for this distinction is that the class of involun-
tary statements are less reliable than the class of statements taken in
technical violation of Miranda.50 This is not to say that every involun-
tary confession is false. Indeed, involuntary confessions are inadmissi-
ble "even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to
support the conviction." 51 Nevertheless, inadmissibility is justified, at
least in part,52 by the increased risk of an untrue confession being ad-
mitted.5 3 A similar increased risk of unreliable evidence is present
when police have found the evidence by means of bad-faith conduct.
Using this evidence in any manner in a court proceeding threatens the
reliability of the outcome.
Thus, there are three integrity-related justifications for excluding
evidence when it has been obtained unlawfully: to redress community
outrage, to preserve judicial integrity, and to prevent admission of a
class of evidence about which reliability concerns exist. All three sup-
port broadening the exclusionary rule when the government has dis-
covered evidence through bad-faith conduct.
48. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) ("Egregious viola-
tions of Fourth Amendment ... liberties ... might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.").
49. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396-402 (1978).
50. See id. at 397-402.
51. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964).
52. For an explanation of the self-incrimination principle that relies less on the relia-
bility of statements and more on choice and autonomy, see George C. Thomas III & Mar-
shall D. Bilder, Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 243 (1991).
53. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 821 (1923) (noting that it is proper to exclude
confessions in criminal cases based on a much lower risk of falsity than is required in civil
cases because of "the higher degree of caution always exercised by the law in favor of the
accused").
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C. Deterrence
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter Fourth Amendment violations.5 4 We as-
sert two premises about deterring violations. First, intentional viola-
tions are inherently more susceptible to deterrence than inadvertent
violations. Second, the greater the scope and harmfulness of a viola-
tion, the more likely it is that the actor intended the violation. Treat-
ing bad-faith violations more harshly can thus be justified on
deterrence grounds alone. Indeed, Justice White, who wrote the
Court's opinion in United States v. Leon55 announcing the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, noted in another case that the use
of the exclusionary rule "is most certainly justified [in] the deterrence
of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment." 56
The Court's justification in Leon for the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule is instructive on the deterrence issue:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes
that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent,
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refus-
ing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts
hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their
future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of
the accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete
good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force.5
7
This quotation implicitly acknowledges the difference between
willful and negligent violations of the Fourth Amendment. While
both violations lack good faith, willful and negligent violations should
be treated differently with respect to deterrence. Sanctions should be
more efficacious when the offender willfully engages in conduct that
she knows is unconstitutional than when she is merely negligent about
her behavior or its consequences. The Leon Court makes clear that
good-faith violations will be treated more favorably.58 Our proposi-
tion is that bad-faith violations be treated less favorably.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
55. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
56. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). For further ex-
plication of White's views on restricting the scope of the exclusionary rule, see Leon, 468
U.S. at 918-25 (announcing good-faith exception to exclusionary rule); Stone, 428 U.S. at
536-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for creation of a good-faith exception).
57. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).
58. See id. at 913-25. To be sure, Leon set an objective rather than a subjective stan-
dard. See DRESSLER, supra note 36, at 250 (noting that "good faith" is, in a sense, a "mis-
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Indeed, though this point rests on notions both of proportionality
and deterrence, criminal law has traditionally drawn a distinction be-
tween harms caused willfully and those caused negligently. In many
cases, for example, harms caused negligently are not considered
crimes at all.5 9 In virtually all cases, harms caused intentionally, or
even recklessly, are punished more severely.
Some might respond that bad-faith violations occur only infre-
quently, and thus there is little need for a greater deterrent. Of
course, those who subscribe to this rationale can take comfort in their
own argument-if our remedy applies only infrequently, its potential
for harm is limited. A broadened exclusionary rule that raises the cost
of bad-faith violations thus appears to be a reasonable deterrence-
based response.
D. Conclusion
This Part presented three justifications for a broad remedy in the
case of bad-faith Fourth Amendment violations. The latter two justifi-
cations-governmental integrity and deterrence-partake of the
Kantian proportionality principle first identified. A higher price for
conduct that is qualitatively more wrongful is both expected by society
and a greater deterrent. The next problem is to identify the conduct
that should be considered qualitatively more wrongful. Following that
discussion, the various limitations on the exclusionary rule will be ana-
lyzed in light of our argument that they should be eliminated when a
bad-faith violation has occurred.
H. Bad-Faith Fourth Amendment Conduct
Courts occasionally have relied on the wrongfulness of a constitu-
tional violation when deciding whether to suppress evidence uncov-
ered by the violation. As noted in Part I, for instance, the Court in
Rochin found that a particular search "shock[ed] the conscience."
Although the extreme facts of Rochin do not provide much guidance
in distinguishing between bad-faith searches and intermediate Fourth
Amendment violations, one can begin with the Rochin principle that if
police are "guilty of unlawfully assaulting, battering, torturing and
nomer" because an officer who knew a warrant was invalid could claim "good faith" if the
objective standard were met). But the deterrence analysis in Leon suggests that the good-
faith exception is based in large part on the difficulty of deterring actors who have good-
faith intentions. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-21.
59. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 244 (1962) (noting that "neg-
ligence is an exceptional basis of [criminal] liability").
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falsely imprisoning" a suspect,6° the search has been conducted in bad
faith.
However, we believe bad-faith searches can occur in the absence
of such extreme violations. One example is United States v. Payner,
61
in which the government seized documents from a bank official's
locked briefcase and sought to use them against Payner, one of the
bank's depositors. The district court held this conduct to be an "out-
rageously illegal seizure" that violated the Due Process Clause.62 The
court found a "purposeful, bad faith hostility toward the Fourth
Amendment rights of" the bank official, designed "to obtain evidence
against persons like Payner."63 This general finding was based in part
on a specific finding that the government
affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment stand-
ing limitation permits them to conduct purposefully an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain
evidence against third parties, who are the real targets of the gov-
ernmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and
will act in the future, according to that counsel.64
One indication that a search has been performed in bad faith,
then, is a purposeful intent to act in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment and to exploit one of the limitations on the exclusionary rule.
But a bad-faith violation can be proven in other ways. An example is
Mapp v. Ohio,65 the 1961 case that, by holding the exclusionary rule
applicable to the states, overturned the 1949 case of Wolf v. Colo-
rado.66 We think it is no coincidence that the Court picked Mapp as
the vehicle to overturn such a recent precedent and accomplish a re-
sult that was bound to be unpopular with state courts, police, and
60. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 167 (quoting People v. Rochin, 225 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950)).
61. 434 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447
U.S. 727 (1980). For a discussion of the grounds on which the Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts, and an evaluation of the reversal, see infra notes 128-144 and accompanying
text.
62. Id. at 133.
63. Id.
64. kl. at 132-33.
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. The Court in Mapp never explicitly stated that it was overruling the contrary pre-
cedent of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The closest the Court came is a statement
that "after [Wol's] dozen years on our books, [we] are led by it to close the only courtroom
door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness" in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55. But the first sentence of Justice Harlan's dissent
begins, quite candidly and correctly, by noting that the Court was "overruling the Wolf
case." Id. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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many politicians. 67 The facts of Mapp provide a good baseline for
delineating bad-faith searches, and therefore the Court's recitation of
the facts will be set out in some detail. Three Cleveland police officers
went to Mapp's house with the hope of finding gambling material and
a person who was wanted in connection with a bombing.68 Upon their
arrival,
the officers knocked on the door and demanded entrance but appel-
lant, after telephoning her attorney, refused to admit them without
a search warrant. They advised their headquarters of the situation
and undertook a surveillance of the house.
The officers again sought entrance some three hours later when
four or more additional officers arrived on the scene. When Miss
Mapp did not come to the door immediately, at least one of the
several doors to the house was forcibly opened and the policemen
gained admittance. Meanwhile Miss Mapp's attorney arrived, but
the officers, having secured their own entry, and continuing in their
defiance of the law, would permit him neither to see Miss Mapp nor
to enter the house. It appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down
the stairs from the upper floor to the front door when the officers,
in this highhanded manner, broke into the hall. She demanded to
see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be a warrant, was held
up by one of the officers. She grabbed the "warrant" and placed it
in her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the officers recovered the
piece of paper and as a result of which they handcuffed appellant
because she had been "belligerent" in resisting their official rescue
of the "warrant" from her person. Running roughshod over appel-
lant, a policeman "grabbed" her, "twisted [her] hand," and she "yel-
led [and] pleaded with him" because "it was hurting." Appellant, in
handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs to her bedroom .... 69
The ensuing search was "widespread," including a dresser, a chest of
drawers, a photo album, personal papers, a child's bedroom, and the
basement. No search warrant was produced at trial, and the police
found neither a bombing suspect nor gambling paraphernalia. In-
stead, they found a few items of obscenity.7
0
There are several remarkable features about the Court's descrip-
tion of the Fourth Amendment violation. One is the Court's value-
laden description of the "facts": The officers "continu[ed] in their de-
fiance of the law"; they acted in a "highhanded manner"; and they ran
67. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment issue in Mapp "was briefed not at all and argued
only extremely tangentially" in the Supreme Court, id. at 676 (Harlan, J., dissenting), sug-
gesting that the Court belatedly recognized that Mapp presented an appropriate case for
overruling Wolf. See supra note 66.
68. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644.
69. Id. at 644-45 (footnote omitted) (brackets in original).
70. Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the evidence offered against Mapp
as "four little pamphlets, a couple of photographs and a little pencil doodle").
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"roughshod over appellant."' 71 These terms suggest a visceral reaction
to the police conduct consistent with the notion of community outrage
at bad-faith searches that undermine governmental integrity.72 The
Court's visceral reaction also appears in its use of gender stereotypes
to make the police misconduct appear more offensive. At key points
in the recitation of facts, for example, the Court abandoned the con-
vention of using the term "appellant" in favor of "Miss Mapp." 73 The
Court noted that Mapp placed the purported warrant in her "bosom,"
and the police rescued it from there after a "struggle." 74 Finally, the
Court described somewhat graphically the physical violence that took
place.75
Consider the elements of the police activity in Mapp that would
justify outrage on the part of the Court. First, the evidence suggests
that the police knew they were violating the Fourth Amendment. The
police initially desisted when Mapp refused them entry; they had time
to obtain a search warrant and apparently did not do so; after they
ultimately broke into her house, they pretended to have a warrant
when she asked to see a warrant; and they refused to allow her lawyer
to see her or to enter the house. The police obviously knew that
Mapp stood before them insisting they respect her privacy rights. The
careful planning of the search and the call for reinforcements also sug-
gests, using criminal law language of homicide, a premeditated
violation.
A second factor in Mapp that could explain the Court's visceral
reaction is the scope of the violation. It is no exaggeration to say, as
Justice Douglas did in his concurring opinion, that the officers "laid
siege to the house."' 76 The ensuing search of the premises was both
extremely thorough and invasive. This is qualitatively different con-
duct than, for example, an officer placing his hand in the pocket of a
suspect and seizing a bag of heroin.77
Third, there was the harmfulness of the search. While every vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment is harmful, we use "harmful" to
71. Id. at 644-45.
72. A cynic might assert that the Court was simply softening up the opposition by
stressing the flagrant abuse of Mapp's Fourth Amendment rights as a way of justifying the
Court's holding. We would agree that the Court likely used value-laden terms to make its
holding more palatable. But the Court would use this technique only if the conduct de-
scribed is likely to evoke a reaction of outrage.
73. See id. at 644.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 644-45.
76. Id. at 667 (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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mean injurious beyond the interference with privacy or property inter-
ests that constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. One example is
the use of excessive force to accomplish the search and seizure. In
Mapp, this type of harm consisted of using physical force to break into
Mapp's house over her objections and to subdue her when she sought
to retain the purported warrant, as well as conducting at least part of
the search in her presence while she was handcuffed. Because the
Fourth Amendment violation was the lack of a warrant, the officers'
treatment of Mapp and her physical and psychological distress can be
viewed as an additional harm.
An additional harm can also exist when more than one violation
of the Fourth Amendment occurs in the same search. Assume that,
along with the obscene items, the police seized a collection of Shake-
speare's plays belonging to Mapp. On these assumed facts, one viola-
tion was the lack of a warrant, and a second would be the seizure of
Mapp's Shakespeare collection, a seizure which presumably would not
have been authorized by any warrant the police might have had.
78
Either type of additional Fourth Amendment violation-excessive
force or multiple violations-is an added harm, indicative of a bad-
faith search.
Finally, the degree to which actual suspicion falls short of legally
sufficient cause is relevant to the bad-faith determination. The greater
the difference between the actual level of suspicion and the level that
is legally sufficient, the more egregious the police conduct becomes.
79
Although the Mapp Court did not address the insufficiency of the sus-
picion, it can be inferred for our purposes from the fact that the police
did not find the bombing suspect or gambling paraphernalia they
sought.80 Obviously, lack of success does not necessarily indicate that
the police lacked probable cause. The term "probable cause" inher-
78. The police in Mapp sought gambling material and a person who was wanted in
connection with a bombing. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. The seizure of a Shakespeare collec-
tion would thus violate the Fourth Amendment even if the police had a warrant to search
for the evidence they sought.
79. The bad-faith factors relating to legally-sufficient cause, and the scope and
harmfulness of the search may be dependent on one another. In Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis generally, the lower the actual suspicion, the narrower the permissible scope and inten-
sity of the police conduct. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968) (holding that
reasonable suspicion, which is less than probable cause, permits only a minimal stop and
frisk for weapons, rather than an arrest and full-blown search incident to arrest).
80. Both Chief Justice Pratt and Lord Mansfield found the common law to include the
failure of the search as one factor making it illegal. See Leach v. Three of the King's
Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 1026 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 502
(K.B. 1763).
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ently means that police will often be mistaken-perhaps even more
often than not. So, by itself, the failure of the search is not dispositive.
Yet, it does seem to have an additive quality on the facts of Mapp.
Given the broad scope of the search, its harmfulness, and the knowl-
edge of the police that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment,
the complete failure8' of the search seems somehow indicative of pa-
tently insufficient cause.
The facts of Mapp thus permit us to identify four factors relevant
to bad faith: the officers' mental state, the scope of the Fourth
Amendment violation, the harmfulness of the violation, and the insuf-
ficiency of cause. The next question is what combination of factors is
required for a finding of bad faith. This question can be answered by
removing one factor at a time. First, remove the fourth factor, the
insufficiency of cause: What if the police have legally-sufficient cause
and the search turns up gambling paraphernalia, but the search is per-
formed with knowledge of violation of the warrant requirement, is ex-
cessive in scope, and is harmful? The other three factors should still
qualify the search as a bad-faith violation. The same holds if factor
three, the harmfulness of the search, is also eliminated. Assume the
officers treated Mapp with courtesy, politely refusing to give her a
copy of the warrant and restraining her only as necessary to conduct
the search. The remaining factors-knowledge of the violation and
excessive scope-suggest that the search still should be considered a
bad-faith violation. Finally, remove the second factor as well by mak-
ing the scope of the search as narrow as possible. Assume the police
discovered gambling paraphernalia as soon as they entered the back
door, arrested Mapp, and searched no more. While we are somewhat
less sure of our conclusion here, we think this is still a bad-faith viola-
tion. The long-standing rule is that, absent "an exceptional situation,"
a warrant is necessary to search a dwelling.82 This rule is clear enough
that its violation on the facts of Mapp suggests a knowing or inten-
tional violation of the Fourth Amendment, which in turn suggests bad
faith.
Removing factors one at a time demonstrates that a culpable
mental state of the police officers is the most important component of
81. By "complete failure," we mean the absence of the sought-after gambling materi-
als and bombing suspect. Obviously, the exclusionary rule cannot be a potential remedy
unless the search uncovered some evidence of criminal activity and thus is not a complete
failure from the perspective of the police. In Mapp, the officers found obscene materials.
82. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (noting that "past decisions make
clear" the existence of this rule).
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a bad-faith violation. This result is hardly surprising, since "bad faith"
implies a wrongful mental state. Indeed, the Leon Court gave exam-
ples of cases in which good faith would be categorically foreclosed,
despite the existence of a warrant. All of these cases involve the of-
ficer's presumptive knowledge that she is violating the Fourth Amend-
ment.83 Of course, the Leon limitations on the good-faith exception
suffice to justify only the truncated exclusionary rule that accompanies
intermediate violations of the Fourth Amendment. But in limiting
Leon, the Court was clearly concerned with intentional misuse of the
warrant process, 84 and intentional misuse would often signal bad faith
as well as the absence of good faith. Thus, the level of culpability of
the officers' mental state seems to be the most important factor in the
bad-faith calculus.
Indeed, the analogy made in the last Part to the distinctions in
criminal law mental states can be expanded. By combining common
law with the Model Penal Code's hierarchy of mental states, the bad-
faith mental states could be described, in a descending hierarchy, as
premeditated, knowing, and reckless. 85 Premeditation involves plan-
ning and calculated conduct. It is similar to the "willful" mental state
83. The Court noted that the officer cannot claim good-faith reliance on a warrant
when (1) the officer-affiant misleads a judge by false information that the affiant "knew
was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth"; (2)
the warrant was obviously deficient, either facially or because it was based on an affidavit
that contained woefully inadequate probable cause; and (3) the judge "wholly abandon[s]
his judicial role" and participates in the search. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923
(1984). Although the last category seems out of place as a measure of the officer's lack of
good faith because the judge seems to be the cause of the violation, the Court blithely
remarked that "in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the
warrant." Id.
84. William Stuntz has made a penetrating analysis of the Court's warrant doctrine.
Stuntz unmasks an underlying, unspoken assumption that police dishonesty in obtaining
warrants is not a major problem. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Rem-
edies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 942 (1991). Like Stuntz, we do not know whether this optimistic
assumption is justifiable. See id. at 942-43. However, even if it is, our proposal would
provide additional penalties in the few instances when the police intentionally act to
deceive the magistrate.
85. We have omitted two Model Penal Code mental states, while adding the common-
law concept of premeditation. We added premeditation because it represents a more cul-
pable mental state and thus evidences bad faith. The omitted mental states are purpose
and negligence. We do not believe that a negligent mental state could ever signal bad faith.
See infra notes 91 -92 and accompanying text. We omitted purpose because, at least in the
context of bad-faith violations, purpose is not substantially different from knowledge. It is
difficult to imagine cases in which the dominant police motive was to violate a suspect's
Fourth Amendment rights rather than to obtain evidence. As long as the dominant motive
is to obtain evidence, the key question is whether the police officer knew that her conduct
was going to violate the Fourth Amendment. There is, then, no reason to make fine dis-
tinctions between knowledge and purpose when making a determination of bad faith.
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required to prove the federal crime of depriving individuals of their
Fourth Amendment rights.86 The Supreme Court has indicated that
this mental state is satisfied when the "aim" of the officers was "to
deny the protection that the Constitution affords." s Although pre-
meditation implies planning, and willful does not, the crux of both
mental states is the aim or purpose to deny an individual a known
protection offered by the Fourth Amendment. Relevant in showing
premeditation would be evidence of prior, similar violations. Ongoing
and systematic violations of the Fourth Amendment can be the most
damaging type of violation and, in our judgment, would always or vir-
tually always indicate bad faith.
The next most culpable mental state is knowing. As it falls short
of premeditation, a finding of a knowing mental state does not neces-
sarily entail a consideration of motives. Nevertheless, the actor's con-
temporaneous knowledge that her conduct violates the Fourth
Amendment suggests bad faith. Knowledge of the constitutional con-
sequences means, after all, that the actor could have chosen not to
violate the Fourth Amendment. By proceeding, she has exhibited a
disregard for the Fourth Amendment that should be strong evidence
of bad faith. Evidence of a good motive can, of course, rebut a finding
of bad faith even when the officer knew she was violating the Fourth
Amendment. Good motives would include protecting public safety
and the difficulty or potential danger of compliance. For example, as-
sume the police had some level of suspicion that the bombing suspect
was in Mapp's house and that he posed a present danger to public
safety. On these assumed facts, the search in Mapp would still be un-
constitutional if the police suspicion did not rise to the level required
by the emergency search doctrine.88 However, the honest belief in the
threat to public safety lessens the bad-faith nature of the search be-
cause recourse to the warrant procedure would be potentially
dangerous.
The third level of culpable mental states is recklessness. Tracking
the language of the Model Penal Code, this mental state is the police
officer's "conscious[ ] disregard[ of] a substantial and unjustifiable
risk" that his conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment. 89 The
86. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (imposing criminal liability for willfully depriving a
person of any rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States).
87. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 102 (1951).
88. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (approving warrantless, emergency
search of dwelling, without specifying the level of suspicion needed to obviate the need for
a warrant).
89. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
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disregarded risk "must be of such a nature and degree that, consider-
ing the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circum-
stances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding [police officer] would observe
in the actor's situation." 90 Given the substantially lower culpability
entailed by reckless conduct, a reckless violation of the Fourth
Amendment would rarely weigh heavily in the bad-faith calculus.
Nonetheless, if the deviation from the typical standard of conduct
were sufficiently gross, the conscious disregard of the risk to Fourth
Amendment values could be a significant factor pointing to bad faith.
By requiring a minimum mental state of recklessness, our bad-
faith standard would be substantially higher than that required for the
federal tort of deprivation of constitutional rights, which requires only
a showing of negligence. 91 As negligent Fourth Amendment viola-
tions constitute what we have been calling intermediate violations,92
our bad-faith concept should require a higher standard. Moreover,
the strong medicine we will shortly prescribe for bad-faith violations
necessitates a relatively high standard of culpability.
The other bad-faith factors-the scope and harmfulness of the vi-
olation, and the insufficiency of cause-become more important as the
culpability of the mental state lessens. Although a bad-faith charac-
terization is unlikely when the officer acts recklessly, it becomes more
likely if the other factors strongly indicate bad faith. Consider
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,93 a case in which the of-
ficers, seeking to inspect and copy otherwise unobtainable business
records, entered a business without a warrant or a "shadow of author-
ity."' 9 4 Leaving aside, for the moment, the officers' mental state, the
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 907 (1981)
(defining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 standard as whether defendants knew or should have known
that their conduct violated constitutional rights).
92. The Leon good-faith violations are, by definition, those in which the officer did
not act negligently. Negligent Fourth Amendment violations would thus constitute the rest
of Fourth Amendment violations in the Court's typology, and we seek to amend that typol-
ogy only by carving out a category of bad-faith violations at the more culpable end of the
spectrum. Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 259 n.14 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (not-
ing that "the question of exclusion must be viewed through a different lens when a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs because the police have reasonably erred" than when
"searches and seizures [are] perpetrated in intentional and flagrant disregard of Fourth
Amendment principles").
93. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
94. Id. at 390-91. The Court's characterization that the officers entered without a
"shadow of authority" was a rejection of the government's claim that the issuance of inva-
lid subpoenas for certain documents provided a colorable basis for the search. Id. That
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
BALANCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SCALES
Silverthorne search weighs heavily in favor of bad faith due to the
scope of the search. The Court noted that the officers made a "clean
sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there" and took
all the items to the United States Attorney's office.95 On these facts,
the harmfulness factor overlaps the scope of the search, although the
seizure suggests an added harm. The police conduct was additionally
harmful to the defendants if some of the seized books and papers
were obviously not evidence of a crime and thus not seizable even
under a warrant. The sufficiency of the cause was not discussed, but
apparently the government did find documents that it wanted to use
against the defendants.96
Making distinctions among mental states of police officers will be
no easier than distinguishing mental states of criminal defendants.
Just as in criminal law, however, the definitional overlap among the
mental states provides a certain rough justice in application. Consider
Silverthorne again. That the officers lacked a "shadow of authority" is
consistent with either a knowing violation or one committed in con-
scious disregard of a particularly high risk of violating the Fourth
Amendment. The weight of the officers' mental state on the bad-faith
calculus in Silverthorne would seem roughly the same whether one
viewed the mental state as knowing or as unusually reckless (based on
a particularly gross deviation from the norm). Of course, if one
viewed the mental state as knowing, one could also make an argument
that it was premeditated as well, because at some point the officers
had to decide whether to obtain a warrant. Viewed as a premeditated
violation, its bad-faith weight would be somewhat greater. Regardless
of how the mental state is characterized, however, the combination of
bad-faith factors led the Silverthorne Court to call the seizure an "out-
rage" 97 and leads us to call it a bad-faith violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
The facts in Irvine v. California98 provide another example of a
bad-faith search. Decided after Rochin but before Mapp, the question
in Irvine was whether the violation rose to the "shock-the-conscience"
level that required a reversal on due process grounds.99 Police had a
locksmith make a duplicate key to Irvine's home. They then entered
reasoning seems proper, since a subpoena requires the recipient to turn over documents; it
is not an authorization for official entry, search, and seizure.
95. Id. at 390.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 391.
98. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
99. Id. at 133-34.
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without a search warrant and installed a microphone in the hall. Over
the next thirty days, police returned twice to move the microphone,
once into the bedroom and later into a closet. The state introduced
conversations heard over this microphone.100
The Court noted that the officers' actions were "a trespass, and
probably a burglary, for which any unofficial person should be, and
probably would be, severely punished."' 0' The Court held, however,
that the violation did not "shock the conscience" because it involved a
"trespass to property, plus eavesdropping," rather than "coercion, vio-
lence or brutality.' 0 2 But consider Irvine under our bad-faith test.
First, the violation was premeditated. Second, the scope was broad,
involving three separate entries into Irvine's home over a thirty-day
period along with extensive eavesdropping. Third, the violation may
have involved additional harm. Indeed, the facts of Irvine suggest a
type of additional harm apart from the ones we discussed earlier.
Some aspects of privacy may deserve particularly scrupulous protec-
tion so that a violation is, without more, evidence of excessive harm.
The privacy of the home may qualify for this heightened protection or,
if not the entire home, surely the privacy of the bedroom. 0 3 With or
without added harm, however, the officers' mental state and the scope
of the search should qualify the police conduct in Irvine as a bad-faith
violation.
The Court seemed to agree, noting that "[flew police measures
have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and per-
sistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth
Amendment."'1 4 The Court's three descriptive terms roughly parallel
the bad-faith factors we have delineated. To describe police conduct
as "flagrantly" and "deliberately" violating the Fourth Amendment is
to make a judgment about the mental state of the officers. The
harmfulness and scope factors are also present: There is a sense in
which "flagrant" implies harmful, and a persistent violation necessar-
ily has a broad scope. Despite these indicia of bad faith, the Court
refused to suppress the conversations, declaring itself insufficiently
100. Id. at 130-31.
101. Id. at 132.
102. Id. at 133.
103. The Court noted that the police activity at issue "would be almost incredible if it
were not admitted." Id. at 132. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980)
(discussing sanctity of the home in Fourth Amendment context); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding heightened privacy in a marital bedroom).
104. Irvine, 347 U.S. at 133.
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shocked to apply Rochin and otherwise bound by precedent to hold
the exclusionary rule nonbinding on the states. 05
The Irvine decision not only helps illustrate our bad-faith factors,
but also demonstrates that Rochin provides an inadequate model for
identifying bad-faith searches. If the search in Irvine does not consti-
tute a bad-faith search, the bad-faith category would be so narrow as
to lose all of its significance. What Charles Black wrote about another
type of outrageous invasion of privacy describes our view of Irvine:
[It] is not so much a case that the law tests as a case that tests the
law .... If our constitutional law could permit such a thing to hap-
pen, then we might almost as well not have any law of constitutional
limitations, partly because the thing is so outrageous itself, and
partly because a constitutional law inadequate to deal with such an
outrage would be too feeble, in method and doctrine, to deal with a
very great amount of equally outrageous material.
1 6
In Part I, we argued that a bad-faith violation requires a broader
application of the exclusionary rule. In this Part, we sought to give
meaning to what constitutes a bad-faith violation. Once a showing of
a bad-faith violation has been made, the next question is precisely
how the exclusionary rule should be broadened. We now turn to this
question.
iI. Remedying Bad-Faith Violations
If bad-faith Fourth Amendment violations should be treated dif-
ferently from intermediate violations, the next question is how that
difference should be recognized in Fourth Amendment doctrine. Our
working premise is that the occurrence of a bad-faith violation creates
a presumption that the evidence should not be used for any purpose, a
result that we will call an "unabated exclusionary rule." This pre-
sumption in bad-faith cases is justified by our Kantian proportionality
principle, which requires a remedy that corresponds, at least roughly,
with the level of harm and degree of wrongfulness of the government
conduct. 0 7 Only an unabated exclusionary rule comes close to being
a proportional remedy for a bad-faith Fourth Amendment violation.
In the context of punishing the wrongdoer, a broader deprivation of
the fruits of the violation is a more proportional penalty for a bad-
faith violation. In the context of redressing the harm, a more wrong-
105. Id. at 133-34.
106. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L.
REv. 3, 32 (1970) (describing Griswold, in which the Court considered whether a state
could criminalize the right of married people to use birth control).
107. See supra Part I.A.
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ful violation requires a broader remedy to minimize the harm that has
befallen the victim of the violation. Though the Court repeatedly ex-
plains that Fourth Amendment violations cannot be undone, 108 un-
abated exclusion comes closest to returning the defendant to the
status quo ante.10 9 In addition to achieving a closer fit between viola-
tion and remedy, an unabated exclusionary rule is an appropriate way
to achieve enhanced deterrence and to minimize loss of confidence in
the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Our presumption in favor of an unabated exclusionary rule in
bad-faith cases has no direct support in the case law. It is indirectly
supported, however, by Justice Holmes's opinion for the Court in
Silverthorne. The issue in that case was whether to exclude, in a grand
jury proceeding, evidence derived from illegally seized evidence." 0 In
holding the proffered evidence inadmissible before the grand jury,
Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, "The essence of a provision for-
bidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely that
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all.""' Thus, the Court extended the exclusionary
rule to "any advantages the Government can gain over the object of
its pursuit by doing the forbidden act.""1
2
Notwithstanding Silverthorne's sweeping language barring "any
advantages," the Supreme Court subsequently created the limitations
on the exclusionary rule noted in the Introduction. Indeed, in United
States v. Calandra,113 the Court substantially undermined, and could
have overruled, Silverthorne. The Calandra court held that a prosecu-
tor could question a suspect about illegally seized evidence during a
pre-indictment grand jury proceeding." 4 Rather than overruling
Silverthorne, the Court distinguished it in a footnote, principally on
the ground that the grand jury in Silverthorne was at a post-indictment
stage and was therefore acting as a general evidence-gathering arm of
108. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) ("[T]he ruptured privacy
of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late."); see
also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443 n.12 (1976) (quoting Linkletter); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (noting that exclusion of evidence is only a remedy);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (noting that the exclusionary rule is calcu-
lated to prevent, not to repair).
109. Because unabated exclusion means that the government cannot use the evidence
at all, it comes closest to undoing the violation by which the evidence was found.
110. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1920).
111. Id. at 392.
112. Id. at 391.
113. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
114. Id. at 342.
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the prosecutor rather than in an investigatory capacity.115 The
Silverthorne Court did not place any weight on this point, however,
and the distinction seems too weak to justify a different result.
A more persuasive way to distinguish Silverthorne is by the
wrongfulness of the underlying Fourth Amendment violation.116 The
Supreme Court had, prior to Calandra, already distinguished
Silverthorne from another case on this ground.1 17 In Calandra, the
federal agents relied on a search warrant. The claimed violation was
that insufficient probable cause supported the warrant, and that the
search exceeded the scope of the warrant." 8 With regard to the first
defect, Leon now dictates that reliance on a defective warrant is not
only lacking in bad faith but also creates a presumption that the of-
ficers have acted good faith.'1 9 With regard to the excessive scope of
the search, the question is whether a loansharking record was within
the scope of a warrant authorizing seizure of bookmaking records and
wagering paraphernalia. 20 Even if the loansharking record is deter-
mined to be outside the scope of the warrant, the resulting Fourth
Amendment violation likely falls significantly short of meeting our
bad-faith test. Thus, the facts in Calandra would not create a pre-
sumption in favor of an unabated exclusionary rule under our
proposal.
115. Id. at 352 n.8.
116. It might be significant that the motion to suppress in Calandra involved testimony
regarding tainted evidence, not the tainted evidence itself. Id. at 342. The Calandra Court
narrowly framed the issue as "whether a witness summoned to appear and testify before a
grand jury may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence
obtained from an unlawful search and seizure." Id. at 339. Thus, the fruit at issue in Ca-
landra was more attenuated from the violation than admission of the tainted documentary
evidence itself. Perhaps Calandra means only that there is a point at which the attenuation
is so great that suppression is unnecessary, particularly when the violation is not very se-
vere. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (explaining that benefits
from tainted evidence can "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint").
117. The Court in United States v. Wallace & iernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949),
explained:
This Court [in Silverthorne] viewed the whole performance of the unlawful search
and seizure of the Silverthorne books and papers as an "outrage," planned or at
least ratified by the Government. Under these circumstances it was held that the
Government was neither entitled to use the original documents nor any knowl-
edge obtained from the originals, the photostats, or the copies.
118. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 341.
119. The good-faith exception in Leon requires that a warrant not be so defective as to
give the officer grounds to question its validity. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Thus, reliance on a
warrant is only presumptively good-faith behavior.
120. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 340-41.
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The Silverthorne Court, by contrast, characterized the seizure in
that case as "an outrage which the Government now regrets.' 121 We
noted in Part II that Silverthorne qualifies as a bad-faith violation
under our test for bad faith.122 On this view, it is the bad-faith nature
of the search in Silverthorne that creates a presumption in favor of an
unabated exclusionary rule and thus distinguishes Calandra.
We view this presumption as rebuttable. There may be reasons
why a particular limitation on the exclusionary rule should apply even
in the face of bad-faith police conduct. We noted earlier that the ex-
clusionary rule is limited in four general ways.123 We will address each
of these limitations in the context of bad-faith violations.
A. Standing
The Fourth Amendment standing doctrine has had a tortuous his-
tory in the Supreme Court.124 Once viewed as a threshold determina-
tion intended to limit the class of litigants to those who were
"aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure,"'125 standing has now
become enshrined in the Fourth Amendment itself.' 26 As presently
conceived, a finding that a defendant has no standing to raise a Fourth
Amendment violation means she was not aggrieved and thus suffered
no Fourth Amendment violation.
27
Perhaps the best example of the Supreme Court's current posi-
tion on the question of standing is United States v. Payner,128 a case
that we used earlier as an example of a bad-faith search. 129 The dis-
trict court opinion in Payner discloses that the government concocted
an elaborate scheme to obtain records of depositors in a foreign
bank.130 This scheme included introducing a female private detective
to a male bank official who frequently traveled to the United States
121. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391.
122. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., 4 LAFAvE, supra note 12, § 11.3.
125. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1960) (quoting the then-current ver-
sion of FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
126. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (noting that whether a criminal
defendant may exclude evidence obtained during a search and seizure turns on whether
that search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant that the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect).
127. Id.
128. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
129. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
130. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 118-20 (N.D. Ohio, 1977), affd, 590
F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
BALANCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SCALES
carrying bank documents in a briefcase. When the bank official subse-
quently made a trip to the United States, he went to the detective's
apartment.131 The bank official left his briefcase at her apartment
while they went to dinner. A government informant entered the
apartment and took the locked briefcase to a locksmith who had been
recommended by the IRS. The locksmith made a key for the brief-
case, the briefcase was opened, and over 400 documents were re-
moved and photocopied. The copies were introduced in the criminal
trial of Payner, one of the depositors. 32 Payner lacked traditional
standing to contest the search because the activity had not invaded
any area in which he had an expectation of privacy.' 33 Nevertheless,
the district court ruled in Payner's favor, finding both a flagrant viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment and, as we noted earlier, intent on the
government's part to exploit the standing exception to the Fourth
Amendment.
34
The Supreme Court reversed.1 35 Because the defendant lacked
standing, the Court held that the intent of the government actors was
simply irrelevant. 36 The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district court's
decision, had relied on the supervisory power of federal courts, rather
than the Fourth Amendment. 37 In reversing, the Supreme Court
wrote, "Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we
would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.' 38
Yale Kamisar has concluded that the Payner Court "never really
spoke" to the issue of whether a narrow exception to the standing
doctrine should exist for flagrant violations, because the Court "never
really asked this question.' 39 While this may be true, Payner suggests
what the Court's answer to that question would have been. The Court
analogized the supervisory power question to the related Fourth
131. The district court pointedly remarked, "What occurred at her apartment, if any-
thing, was not brought out at trial." Id. at 119.
132. Id. at 123.
133. Id. at 126.
134. Id. at 131-33.
135. Unites States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
136. Id. at 731-32.
137. United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206, 207 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727
(1980) (per curiam) ("Since we base our decision upon the exercise of supervisory powers,
it is not necessary to reach the constitutional questions raised on the appeal.").
138. 447 U.S. at 737.
139. Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREiIrHTON L. REv. 565, 638 (1983).
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Amendment issues. 140 The Court also explicitly stated that the de-
fendant's due process argument, even if premised on outrageous gov-
ernment conduct of the kind seen in Rochin, was equally flawed by
lack of standing. 141 The Payner decision thus seemed to indicate that
a defendant could never suppress evidence found in a search, no mat-
ter how flagrant the Fourth Amendment violation, if the defendant
lacked standing to assert the violation.
The Payner decision, however, preceded the Court's recognition
in Leon that when a police officer acts in good faith, application of the
exclusionary rule is unnecessary because deterrence is not sufficiently
served in good-faith cases.142 Given this understanding of the rela-
tionship between deterrence and the officer's mental state, police bad
faith argues in favor of a heightened application of the exclusionary
rule to achieve heightened deterrence. The flipside of the Leon argu-
ment thus suggests exclusion regardless of standing. Abolishing the
standing requirement for bad-faith violations creates no systemic costs
beyond the loss of evidence, a cost that always attends the exclusion-
ary rule. This loss of evidence would be justified, in our view, if the
definition of bad-faith conduct is limited to police conduct that is suffi-
ciently injurious to the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
In light of the new understanding wrought by Leon of the impor-
tance of a police officer's mental state, a court facing a bad-faith case
might read Payner narrowly to forbid only the use of supervisory pow-
ers as a substitute for the Fourth Amendment. Consistent with such a
reading of Payner, the Fourth Amendment can provide the answer in
a bad-faith search case, an answer different from the one the Court
found under the supervisory power. 143 In our view, Justice Murphy
properly addressed standing in an early bad-faith case when he noted
in dissent that to allow the government to use evidence "against par-
ties not victims of the unconstitutional search and seizure is to allow
the Government to profit by its wrong and to reduce in large measure
the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment."' 44
140. 447 U.S. at 736. The Court characterized its holding as a "reject[ion]" of the use
of supervisory powers "as a substitute for established Fourth Amendment doctrine." Id. at
736 n.8.
141. Id. at 737 n.9.
142. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
143. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 26, at 469 (noting that "if ever a fact situation
cried out for recognition of [a broader standing doctrine], Payner was it").
144. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 127 n.4 (1942) (Murphy, J., joined by
Stone, C.J., and Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Although neither the Goldstein Court nor the
dissent characterized the government conduct as bad faith, the dissent noted that the gov-
ernment told the defendants after arrest, "We have watched your telephone; we have
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B. Use at Trial
Illegally-seized evidence can be used at trial to impeach a defend-
ant.145 The Court has noted that to suppress such evidence when it is
offered for impeachment would "pervert[ ]" the constitutional shield
against the use of illegally-seized evidence "into a license to use per-
jury by way of a defense.' 46 Although this rationale may well justify
refusing to suppress impeachment evidence obtained by intermediate
Fourth Amendment violations, it is unclear whether it is sufficient to
rebut our working presumption that bad-faith violations should never
produce admissible evidence.
When a bad-faith violation produces the evidence at issue, the
government has unclean hands. The government is asserting an inter-
est in truth-telling at the same time it seeks to introduce evidence ob-
tained by its own immoral conduct. Moreover, by the time of trial, the
government's bad-faith conduct will already have been demonstrated
in a pretrial hearing to suppress. Sanctioning that demonstrated gov-
ernment misconduct by admitting the evidence would likely be more
unsettling to the community than the possibility that a defendant
might testify less than truthfully. Thus, the broadly defined interest in
preserving governmental integrity would be undermined. Finally, the
Court's refusal to apply the exclusionary rule is not the only way to
penalize or deter perjury; bad-faith evidence could be suppressed in
the initial criminal trial and then admitted in a separate perjury prose-
cution.147 This approach would allow the government to address the
watched all these lawyers' telephones; we have had rooms tapped.... You have been in
this for so many years .... " Id. at 123. Moreover, the dissent concluded that the motive
behind telling the defendants about the extensive wiretapping was "to use the 'taps' to
secure other testimony." Id. The evident knowledge of the violation, the broad scope of
the violation, and the exploitation of the illegally-seized evidence in an attempt to get
other evidence suggests bad faith. To be sure, Goldstein was not a Fourth Amendment
case because the Amendment did not apply to wiretaps in 1942. The defendants' claim was
based on the violation of a federal statute, and Justice Murphy's reference to the Fourth
Amendment, quoted in the text, was by way of analogy. Analyzed under today's doctrine,
however, the federal agents' conduct would constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that warrantless eavesdropping of
a telephone booth constituted a Fourth Amendment violation). Moreover, we think the
violation would likely rise to the level of a bad-faith violation.
145. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
146. Id. at 626 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)).
147. A defendant who commits perjury during his criminal trial has committed a wrong
against the justice system similar to that of the government actor who engages in bad-faith
conduct to uncover evidence designed to prove guilt. As no substantial reason exists to
prefer one wrong over the other, the system could adopt a hands-off policy and thus permit
use, in perjury prosecutions, of tainted evidence, even if obtained in bad faith.
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perjury-a distinct wrong from any underlying crime-without al-
lowing the government to use bad-faith evidence in a prosecution for
which the evidence was originally obtained.
Of course, the easy answer to the unclean-hands argument is that
the government's immorality took place in the past and the defendant
is presently seeking to commit perjury. On this view, the cost of li-
censing perjury is both real and weighty. This concern seems likely to
outweigh any community upset at the use of the evidence obtained by
bad-faith methods. In addition, use of impeachment evidence is
merely a means of preventing the perjury from having an effect. As-
suming the defendant is committing perjury, there is no net cost in
terms of damage to judicial integrity by using impeachment evidence
obtained through bad-faith conduct, because permitting perjury to go
unchecked would damage judicial integrity at least as much as admit-
ting the tainted evidence. On these assumptions, it is difficult to argue
that a past governmental wrong somehow justifies permitting the de-
fendant to commit a present wrong.
However, two additional arguments favor the unabated exclu-
sionary rule in the impeachment context. First, if a broadened exclu-
sionary rule provides more deterrence, one would want as few
exceptions as possible. It is easier to communicate the message to an
officer that no benefits accrue from a bad-faith violation than the
message that a bad-faith violation causes the government to lose
some, but not all, of the uses it would otherwise have had.
Second, as argued earlier, the flagrant nature of the police con-
duct that underlies our definition of bad faith suggests at least modest
skepticism about the reliability of the connection between the incrimi-
nated defendant and the evidence produced by bad-faith conduct.
"Truth" is not so easy to determine when the evidence demonstrating
guilt was produced by bad-faith conduct. Thus, the moral dilemma of
the defendant openly lying while the prosecutor is forbidden to un-
mask the lie is not so clearly present in bad-faith cases. If a substantial
number of bad-faith cases involve manufactured or exaggerated con-
nections, the moral high road that underlies the impeachment excep-
tion is eroded, perhaps to the extent that the system should not draw a
distinction between the immorality of defendants and that of the
government.
The impeachment exception may be the most difficult exception
to reconcile with our proposal. However, because deterrence is best
served by a broad exclusionary rule, and because our definition of
bad-faith conduct entails flagrant violations, we would resolve doubts
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in favor of the Silverthorne rule forbidding the government from gain-
ing any "advantages" from its "outrage[ous]" conduct.148 By "advan-
tages," we think the Silverthorne Court meant an increased chance of
conviction for the crime demonstrated by the seized evidence. This
would not include a subsequent perjury prosecution based on testi-
mony at the initial criminal trial. Thus, our proposal would permit the
use of bad-faith evidence in this type of perjury prosecution.1 49
C. The Requirement of Criminal Proceedings
The Court has held in a series of cases that the exclusionary rule
applies only in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, defined as
those that seek "to penalize for the commission of an offense against
the law."' 50 Even within the context of criminal proceedings, the ex-
clusionary rule applies only to the trial and direct appeal. It applies
neither to preliminary nor ancillary proceedings, such as investigative
grand jury hearings and civil deportation hearings.151 Nor does it sup-
port relief from a conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceedings
when the state courts have "provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim.'
52
The rationale for limiting the effect of the exclusionary rule to
criminal or quasi-criminal trials and direct appeal is purely deterrence-
based. As the Court said in Calandra, the "incremental deterrent ef-
fect" must be thought to offset the cost of the exclusionary rule before
it can be applied in any procedural context. 53 Based on the Court's
assessment that police officers worry, to the extent they worry at all,
only about loss of evidence at the suspect's criminal trial, only crimi-
nal (or, in a few cases, quasi-criminal) proceedings can justify use of
the exclusionary rule.'5 4
The deterrence calculus changes in two ways when a bad-faith
violation is demonstrated. First, the greater harm created by individ-
ual bad-faith violations suggests that a smaller incremental deterrent
148. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920).
149. We distinguish the situation in the text from a perjury prosecution that follows the
bad-faith seizure without an intervening criminal trial. Thus, if the government seizes doc-
umentary evidence demonstrating perjury in an earlier setting, that evidence should be
subject to the bad-faith exclusionary rule because it is an "advantage" in the Silverthorne
sense of the term.
150. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
151. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, §§ 1.7, 1.10.
152. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
153. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974).
154. See LAFAVE & IsRAE, supra note 26 , at 116-17.
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effect would justify the application of the exclusionary rule. Second,
the premeditated or knowing mental state that would accompany
most bad-faith violations makes them particularly susceptible to de-
terrence. Thus, although the incremental deterrent effect might still
be small, it should be larger in the bad-faith category than in the case
of intermediate violations, and any gain here seems worth the cost.
Moreover, part of our thesis is that application of the exclusion-
ary rule in bad-faith cases can be justified on grounds other than de-
terrence. The proportionality principle suggests that the government
should pay an additional penalty for its bad-faith conduct, and one
way to increase the penalty would be to deny use of the evidence in
other proceedings. Governmental integrity is also at risk. To have the
government seek a judgment on the basis of evidence seized through
bad-faith conduct is bound to erode public confidence in the judicial
system.
The primary cost associated with application of the exclusionary
rule to other proceedings is the potential for introducing additional
procedural complexities. For example, grand jury proceedings and
preliminary examinations would almost always precede the filing of a
motion to suppress, thus requiring an early determination of police
bad faith. Making such a determination would cause at least occa-
sional delay and disruption in the "orderly progress" of these screen-
ing procedures. 155 It was this added complexity, balanced against
what the Court found to be an insignificant gain in deterrence, that led
the Court in Calandra to hold the exclusionary rule inapplicable to
grand jury proceedings. 56
The added complexity of holding a hearing on the question of
police bad faith in the context of a screening procedure is a real cost,
sufficient in our view to justify refusal to extend the exclusionary rule
to these preliminary proceedings. However, this complexity cost is
much less significant outside the context of screening procedures. For
example, it is much less severe in civil proceedings that are designed
to produce a final judgment, and it does not arise at all in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. In federal habeas proceedings, no addi-
tional findings would be required because the record of the initial sup-
pression hearing would provide a basis to review the bad-faith issue.
In civil proceedings brought by the government, the bad-faith nature
of the violation would have to be litigated, but proceedings of this
155. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349 (discussing significance of delays in grand jury
proceedings).
156. Id. at 354.
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type already contemplate a thorough presentation of the defendant's
side of the case. Inquiring into the bad-faith nature of the police con-
duct is a small cost to pay to achieve proportionality, enhanced deter-
rence, and governmental integrity. Thus, a bad-faith violation
requires application of the exclusionary rule in federal habeas pro-
ceedings, as well as any proceeding brought by the government that is
designed to reach a final judgment.
Though we agree with the Court that the exclusionary rule should
be unavailable in preliminary screening proceedings, that does not
mean that the exclusionary rule is necessarily deprived of effect. One
way to accommodate the competing interests in this context is to per-
mit the evidence to be introduced in the preliminary proceedings and
then dismiss the case later, prior to verdict, if some preliminary stage
was tainted by the bad-faith conduct. 157 We envision pre-trial motions
(to dismiss the prosecution or suppress or return seized evidence) as
the first time that a defendant would be permitted to argue that evi-
dence is tainted by bad-faith conduct.158 As jeopardy does not attach
at this early stage of the process, 159 the government could begin the
grand jury process anew, albeit without recourse to the bad-faith evi-
dence. Thus, when we use the term "unabated exclusionary rule," we
157. We think a harmless-error analysis should apply to the dismissal of prosecutions.
If it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that exclusion of the bad-faith evidence would not
have changed the result of the grand jury deliberation or the preliminary hearing, the pros-
ecution should not be dismissed. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967) (hold-
ing that a conviction need not be reversed if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
constitutional trial error "did not contribute" to the conviction). Moreover, a conviction at
trial, when the bad-faith evidence was not used, would be conclusive evidence that the
screening procedures were not tainted by the bad-faith evidence, and no dismissal could be
ordered later. This explains the qualifying phrase "prior to verdict" in the text.
158. The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals on the issue of when courts may dis-
miss indictments. Compare Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988)
(acknowledging power of courts to dismiss indictments based on clear prosecutorial mis-
conduct before grand jury) with United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1739 (1992).
(rejecting "supervisory power" of courts to proscribe rules of prosecutorial conduct, such
as mandatory disclosure of exculpatory evidence, before grand juries). Nonetheless, we
believe that dismissal of indictments due to bad-faith Fourth Amendment violations is per-
missible. The Williams decision may be nothing more than a Payner-type restriction on the
use of so-called "supervisory powers" by federal courts. See supra notes 137-143 and ac-
companying text. In addition, the Williams Court expressly noted that dismissal of an in-
dictment is permissible when the conduct in question is proscribed by rule, statute or the
Constitution. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1741. Under our proposition, dismissal is required by
the Fourth Amendment when the indictment is predicated on evidence obtained by bad-
faith government conduct. Thus, bad-faith violations should fit within the category of cases
in which dismissal is still permissible after Williams.
159. See United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S.
377 (1975).
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mean it to include the right to dismiss a case without prejudice when
earlier proceedings were tainted by bad-faith evidence.
D. The Relationship Between Evidence and Violation
The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is the mechanism by
which the Court controls how much evidence is tainted by an initial
Fourth Amendment violation. 160 The question here is ultimately
causal in nature-did the violation cause the evidence to be discov-
ered? The causal connection may be rebutted in three ways. First, the
state may prove that the evidence was obtained from an independent
source.161 In that situation, leaving aside the nuances of determining
when the source is truly independent, 162 the causal connection be-
tween violation and evidence is completely severed. With no causal
connection, the bad-faith nature of the violation is not relevant to the
question of suppression. Therefore, our proposal would not affect the
independent-source doctrine.
A second way of rebutting the causal connection is to find the
link "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of the original viola-
tion.163 Attenuation analysis focuses on the conduct of the defendant
to determine, in effect, if any of her volitional acts constitute an inter-
vening or supervening cause of the subsequent discovery. 164 In this
category of cases, the bad-faith nature of the violation is extremely
relevant. A unanimous Court has noted that the "purpose and fla-
grancy of the official misconduct" is "particularly" important to the
attenuation analysis. 165 Although the Court did not specify why "pur-
pose and flagrancy" are "particularly" important, we agree with one
commentator who has concluded that the deterrence of bad-faith vio-
lations "ought to be greater and, therefore, the scope of exclusion
160. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (ruling on whether
Fourth Amendment should exclude incriminating statements and formal confessions made
after unconstitutional arrests); George C. Thomas III, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Deten-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413 (1986) (considering whether exclusionary rule should apply to
statements made during unconstitutional pretrial detention).
161. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
162. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 544-51 (1988) (Marshall, J., joined
by Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty in being certain that a
subsequent search was, in fact, independent of the illegal search).
163. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
164. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
165. Id. at 604.
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broader.' 66 This need for broader exclusion justifies a per se rule
that no attenuation occurs.
The final method of rebutting a causal link between violation and
evidence is the "inevitable discovery" rule.167 If the police would have
found the evidence even if the violation had not occurred, the causal
connection is broken, at least in a hypothetical sense. The Court has
rejected any role for bad faith in this analysis, noting that suppressing
evidence that would have been found in any event puts "police in a
worse position than they would have been in if no unlawful conduct
had transpired"' 68 and thus constitutes a disproportionate penalty.
While this point has force, the break in the causal link in an inevi-
table-discovery case is only a hypothetical break; the police have, in
fact, found the evidence by means of a violation. Given the inherently
speculative nature of this kind of inquiry,169 it is almost as if courts
permit the government to engage in a kind of make-believe because of
"the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for
truth.' 70 However, as we argued in connection with the impeach-
ment exception, the category of evidence found by bad-faith viola-
tions is sufficiently suspect in terms of its connection with the
defendant that the truth is not so easily determined. If our skepticism
about the reliability of evidence obtained by bad-faith violations is
justified, there is much less reason to permit the government to play
make-believe when it is guilty of the bad-faith conduct that creates
these reliability problems.17 ' If one adds in the deterrent value of an
enhanced penalty, exclusion is warranted without regard to whether
the police would have "inevitably discovered" the evidence, except
upon a showing of an actual independent source.
166. Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 1136, 1151 (1967).
167. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
168. Id. at 445.
169. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 12, at 383-84.
170. Nix, 467 U.S. at 445.
171. Indeed, in the seminal inevitable-discovery case, the Court found the evidence
admissible after stressing that the police conduct "did nothing to impugn the reliability of
the evidence in question," id. at 446, thus implicitly acknowledging the importance of relia-
bility to the inevitable-discovery analysis. Rather than approach this question on a case-
by-case basis as the Court seemed to do in Nix, we would adopt a categorical rule about
evidence found in bad-faith searches. Given the flagrant conduct that underlies our defini-
tion of bad faith, we believe that reason exists to be skeptical in every case of the connec-
tion between the incriminated defendant and the evidence that results from bad-faith
searches.
November 1993]
Independent-source cases are different in kind from all other po-
tential exceptions to our unabated exclusionary rule because they are
the only cases in which the evidence is truly not a fruit of the poison-
ous tree. Independent-source evidence breaks the casual link be-
tween violation and evidence. Therefore, the admission of this
evidence should not undermine the deterrent value of our otherwise
unabated exclusionary rule.
E. A Summary
Current doctrine permits an officer knowingly to violate the
Fourth Amendment while being confident that the evidence obtained
may be used to prosecute people who lack standing, impeach a de-
fendant's credibility, prosecute noncriminal cases, or find other evi-
dence. Police officers already have plenty of other incentives to
violate the Fourth Amendment, such as preventing a suspect from
fleeing, 172 confiscating contraband, 173 and making certain that no one
in the vicinity is armed. 74 Without an unabated exclusionary rule,
police officers also have evidentiary incentives to commit knowing
and flagrant violations of the Fourth Amendment. This result is unac-
ceptable given the societal values underlying the Fourth Amendment.
If our proposal were adopted, the judicial system would inevita-
bly develop an appropriate definition of bad faith in light of the evi-
dentiary consequences of finding bad faith. Societal conventions
about police conduct and the uses of tainted evidence would also in-
form the definition of bad faith. An unabated exclusionary rule for all
evidence causally linked to bad-faith violations would cause the bad-
faith line to be drawn near the more flagrant end of the spectrum of
police conduct, a self-adjusting process that requires a grave violation
to justify the severity of the remedy.
In our view, the Silverthorne philosophy protects against the un-
acceptable when evidence is obtained, as it was in Silverthorne,
through bad-faith methods: "The essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
172. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (finding a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion when police halt a fleeing suspect by use of deadly force, unless the "suspect poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others").
173. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 45 (1968) (stating that officer told suspected
heroin addict, "You know what I am after," and then thrust his hand into addict's pocket to
retrieve several glassine envelopes containing heroin).
174. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (finding violation of Fourth Amendment
when police frisked several patrons of a bar in a general weapons search).
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used at all."' 75 While, for better or worse, this mandate has eroded
somewhat, it should be resuscitated for bad-faith violations. Under
this view, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine extends beyond
tainted evidence, reaching tainted uses. Whenever the government
would obtain an advantage that is linked to a bad-faith violation, the
exclusionary rule should apply to deprive the government of the ad-
vantage. The Fourth Amendment could thereby allow society to feel
comfortable in the knowledge that the state can gain no benefit from
flagrant misconduct that intrudes on privacy. Either privacy remains
intact against such invasions, or the state cannot use the evidence pro-
duced by the invasion.
IV. The Procedure for Finding Bad Faith
The Fourth Amendment requires recognition of a category of vi-
olations we have called bad-faith violations. Evidence causally linked
to a bad-faith violation could not be used. We defined this category of
bad-faith violations in terms of four factors, all of which have already
been suggested by courts as relevant to suppression determinations.
The most important factor is the mental state of the government agent
who violates the Fourth Amendment. Premeditated violations would
almost always be in bad faith, reckless violations would only occasion-
ally be in bad faith, and knowing violations would produce mixed re-
sults. Other relevant factors are the scope and harmfulness of the
violation, and the insufficiency of the cause.
The question discussed in this Part is who should decide whether
the police have acted in bad faith. In earlier articles, we argued that
juries are capable of representing society176 and should therefore play
a greater role in determining what society would deem to be reason-
able and unreasonable searches. 177 We have also argued for a com-
plete severance of right and remedy questions in Fourth Amendment
procedure, with juries deciding when the police conduct was unrea-
sonable, and judges deciding, on a case-by-case basis, whether sup-
pression should accompany violations found by juries. 78 If our bad-
faith proposal were added to this system, judges would have no discre-
175. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added).
176. See Thomas & Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, supra note 1, at 15-27.
177. See Thomas & Pollack, Saving Rights From A Remedy, supra note 1, at 152-63.
178. Id. at 182-88.
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tion on the suppression question once the jury had found a bad-faith
violation.1
79
Whatever the merits of our idea that juries should decide all
Fourth Amendment violation questions, juries are particularly well-
equipped to decide when police have found evidence through a bad-
faith violation. No one can define with any precision what bad faith
means without reference to the expectations or conventions of society.
It is therefore particularly important to let juries, speaking for society,
decide .when police have acted in bad faith. As noted earlier, many
people distrust law enforcement officers today. Giving juries the
power to decree that the police have acted in bad faith is one small,
but symbolically significant, way of putting the community in charge
of the police.
Some might say that juries already have the power to punish fla-
grant police violations by ruling against the offenders when civil ac-
tions are brought against the police. 180 However, few civil actions are
brought by individuals who are found in possession of evidence of a
crime, regardless of the gravity of the police violation.' 8' The only
effective way to deny the government the fruits of bad-faith conduct is
to force the prosecutor to run the suppression gauntlet. The commu-
nity, acting through a jury, would be the best adjudicator.
We do not wish, however, to tie our present proposal to our ear-
lier call for juries to decide Fourth Amendment violations. Under the
current system, judges decide when the Fourth Amendment has been
violated. It would be easier to implement our current proposal by
requiring judges to consider bad-faith claims as part of the suppres-
sion hearing. The only additional burden this would place on the sup-
pression judge would be to require her to hear an additional set of
arguments and to make an additional ruling on the bad-faith issue.
179. In our earlier Article, we recognized that the severity of a violation could invoke
automatic suppression. We explained that trial-level suppression decisions could be re-
viewed on an abuse-of-discretion standard, and that "[a]n abuse would exist, in our view, if
a judge refused to suppress evidence after a violation was found based on evidence that the
police acted in bad faith .... " Id. at 188.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
181. See, e.g., Spiotto, supra note 22, at 269-72. There is, of course, no requirement
that civil plaintiffs be found in possession of contraband or evidence of a crime. An unsuc-
cessful search that violates the Fourth Amendment would give rise to liability under § 1983
(and would be more likely to be received favorably by a jury). But we are concerned in
this Article only with the question of whether the exclusionary rule should apply more
broadly to bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the relevant class of crim-
inal defendants-civil plaintiffs for our purposes must have been found in possession of
some item of evidence that the state seeks to introduce against them.
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The bad-faith ruling would be reviewed in conjunction with the other
suppression rulings through the normal appellate process. We do not
believe this to be a substantial burden. Furthermore, any burden that
is created would be far outweighed by deterring flagrant violations
and restoring some community confidence in the criminal justice
system.
Society must know that no incentives exist for an officer to in-
trude excessively on societal privacy by committing bad-faith viola-
tions of the Fourth Amendment. Society can best achieve this goal
through juries sitting as factfinders in motions to suppress and render-
ing verdicts on whether violations are bad-faith violations. As no sys-
tem is currently in place to permit juries to make Fourth Amendment
decisions, however, the present system should first be changed to add
the bad-faith inquiry to the judicial task of deciding motions to sup-
press. In either event, the finding of a bad-faith violation should deny
the government what Justice Holmes attempted to deny it over sev-
enty years ago: "any advantages that the Government can gain... by
doing the forbidden act."'
Conclusion
Accepting the Supreme Court's justification for the exclusionary
rule, courts should use a trifurcated, rather than a bifurcated categori-
zation of violations when deciding whether to suppress evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Presumably, most
cases fit within the intermediate category of violations existing be-
tween good-faith and bad-faith violations. In this intermediate cate-
gory, suppression is limited to the state's case-in-chief in the criminal
prosecution of the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were vio-
lated. The Leon good-faith category entails no suppression. Finally,
182. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391. Although we would exempt screening procedures
and the independent-source doctrine from our expanded exclusionary rule, both exemp-
tions are consistent with Justice Holmes's statement. As we recommend reversal of screen-
ing procedures tainted by bad-faith evidence, see supra notes 157-159 and accompanying
text, the government is not getting any lasting advantage from the use of that evidence in
grand jury hearings and preliminary hearings. The independent-source exception is actu-
ally implied by the Holmes quote; the government has not gained any advantage by doing
the forbidden act if the evidence is obtained from an independent source. The language we
omitted from the Holmes quote is "over the object of its pursuit." This language qualifies
"advantages that the Government could gain," and thus could imply a standing limitation.
Since there was no standing issue in Silverthorne, however, we choose to treat that part of
the sentence as merely describing the situation before the Court. Whatever Holmes's view
of the matter, we would dispense with a standing requirement when the government ob-
tained the evidence by means of a bad-faith search.
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the bad-faith exception we propose recognizes the category of flagrant
violations from which no advantages can be gained.
Although presumably few searches or seizures fall within the bad-
faith category, those that do pose a great threat to the interests pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. Increased penalties are thus re-
quired. Specifically, we recommend the full availability of federal
habeas proceedings, the right to suppress in civil actions brought by
the government, the removal of the standing requirement and im-
peachment exception, and broadening the category of suppressible ev-
idence linked to the violation. In short, the shackles should be
removed from the exclusionary rule when the government seeks to
use evidence derived from bad-faith conduct by government actors.
